It is important to begin by making it clear that Sendero Luminoso (SL) never completely disappeared. It has been alive from 1980, when it embarked upon armed insurrection ? indeed, from a decade or so before that - then, after suffering a severe defeat, went through a period of low-profile activity, and nowadays operates within parameters that differ considerably from those of the 1980s, but maintaining the same strategic target: to carry forward its 'popular war' in order to seize power and establish a different kind of state in the medium or long term.
Just a remnant?
Are those senderistas who operate in the coca-growing areas just, as the government says, a tiny 'remnant'? The answer must be no. The SL columns in the coca-growing valleys of the Alto Huallaga and the Apurímac-Ene are not the sole remnant of the organisation. The Proseguir ('Continue') faction is not confined to a few small armed bands at the service of, or somehow implicated in, drug trafficking. On the contrary, official and journalistic information reports senderista presences in state organisations, unions, universities, schools. It is therefore more accurate to talk of a proliferation of senderistas playing different roles within the framework of a global strategy.
But has SL managed to build up sufficient military capacity to become, once again, a threat to the Peruvian state? Was it not the case that SL had been defeated strategically? Yes and no. A series of intelligence successes (such as the capture of SL leader Abimael Guzmán as well as that of most of his close lieutenants), together with a tight control of the media (which meant that SL actions were deliberately disguised, as actions by common criminals, natural disasters or equipment malfunctions, played down or simply not reported at all) allowed the Fujimori government to 'sell' to the Peruvian people the notion that Peru had been completely 'pacified'. In other words, that the Peruvian state had actually won the war against the Shining Path.
Just before the 1995 general elections, the Fujimori government introduced the term 'remnants' to refer to those senderistas still up in arms. The government used their actions politically (those which were too difficult to hide from the general public or those which were specifically allowed to be known) ? first in order to get reelected and then, in 1995-2000, as a smokescreen for the corruption, human rights abuses, and authoritarianism so prevalent throughout the Fujimori years. The transitional government of Valentín Paniagua and the current government of Alejandro Toledo - perhaps for fear of being seen as incompetent in the fight against terrorism - continue using the term 'remnants' to refer to the SL, and to deny that there has been any 'resurgence' of the organisation.)
Bouncing back
As early as 1993, when a 'peace accord' was being discussed with the government, SL was attempting to overcome what Guzmán had called the 'bend in the road' - his capture. It is thus not yet defeated in its attempt to develop a renewed strategy, in a totally different local and global context, but with the same ultimate aims of more than twenty years ago. The argument of the strategic defeat of the Shining Path that could have been somewhat valid until the mid-1990s, but today does not hold any more.
The spectacular kidnapping of the Techint pipeline workers on 9 June and the ensuing ambushes of military patrols in the Ene valley, are undeniable facts. The same can be said of the corroborated reports of senderistas trying to reestablish a presence and a following in the zone of the Ene. However, to derive from this that SL has once again become an immediate threat to the very existence and survival of the Peruvian state, is sheer alarmism. Everything indicates that these forces are very far from putting Peruvian national security at risk.
Who is in control?
Who directs the present senderista strategy? Is it possible that Guzmán is directing from his cell the SL columns operating in the central forest, as people like Benedicto Jiménez and the 'senderologist' Raúl González maintain? This is possible but much less, if at all, probable. Indeed, to claim that the 'resurgence' of SL was caused by the relaxation of the prison régime that the transition government had to grant the senderistas, is perhaps the greatest misreading of events ever made by most members of the Peruvian media and some political and military analysts.
Recently, in order to prove that claim, letters and notebooks found in diverse penitentiaries were produced, purportedly containing a series of instructions dictated by Guzmán to his companion Elena Iparraguirre. It was later demonstrated that the notebooks were not written by Iparraguirre.
So who is disseminating this interpretation (or 'psycho-social operation', as the government has called it)? Several candidates have been suggested: members of the security services seeking increased budgets; personal quarrels between former heads of Dircote; unemployed 'senderologists'; former members of the Fujimori régime seeking to undermine the Toledo government - indeed, even the Proseguir faction of SL.
The Proseguir faction
So who are the members of this Proseguir faction? For the answer we have to go back to the split that took place within SL in 1993. Then, letters allegedly showing Guzmán's wish to reach a peace agreement with the government of Alberto Fujimori, were made public by the government. At that time, the authorship and signature of these letters were presented as those of Guzmán himself (photographs and a video of someone looking very much like Guzmán signing the letters were presented as proof of this). It was only in May 2002 that, in an interview with the Peruvian weekly Caretas, Rafael Merino Bartlet - a long-serving political and legal adviser of the now-defunct state intelligence agency, SIN - confessed that he, not Guzmán, had been the author of the letters and that these had been part and parcel of an intelligence plan to convince Guzmán of the futility of continuing with his 'popular war'.
In the last 11 years, and with all of its historical leadership in prison, SL has undergone deep ideological, doctrinal and organisational changes. At present two factions exist: the acuerdistas (those in favour of the peace accord) and Proseguir (those in favour of the continuation of armed struggle). The acuerdistas are the 'historical' organisation led by Guzmán, which seeks a political solution involving a general amnesty.
Those from Proseguir, also called 'Sendero Rojo' (Red Path), insist on the continuation of the 'popular war'. Somewhat de-ideologised and completely dissociated from the messianic leadership of Guzmán, the latter, reportedly under the command of Oscar Ramírez Durand ('Feliciano'), continued conducting armed actions in the Huallaga and Ene areas after his capture in July 1999. They wish to establish a 'liberated zone' in this area.
Somewhere in between these two positions, according to speculation by the national intelligence agency, CNI, is 'Artemio' (who took over from 'Feliciano'), still undecided as to which 'shining path' he will take. Although ideologically closer to Guzmán, his practice is closer to that of Proseguir.
Parting of the ways
It is assumed by many in Peruvian officialdom that the Proseguir faction ordered and financed the bombing attack of El Polo in March 2002 and that it is trying to reorganise the Metropolitan Committee (which in the 1980s and 1990s masterminded activities in the capital. The presence of Proseguir in Lima was made manifest in the planting of explosives in markets and municipalities in September 2001, and in other similar activities last year.
The break of this faction with the 'historical' SL is assumed to have been made final in SL's second congress, held in July-August 2002 in Lima. The representatives of the main and central regional committees opposed the strategy of seeking a political solution, proposed by the acuerdistas. Instead, they advocated the continuation and escalation of the 'popular war'.
Not finding support in the other committees, they are said to have stopped recognising Guzmán as SL leader and denied him the title 'President Gonzalo' - while still subscribing to 'Gonzalo thought', the set of ideas SL considers the ultimate manifestation of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist ideology. Finally, they also excommunicated other leaders, and especially 'Artemio', who supported the acuerdista position, and returned to the Ene valley.
Recent operational patterns suggest that Proseguir has mutated, adopting modalities and tactics similar to those of the Colombian Farc guerrillas. Their last actions are part of a new strategy that has as one of its main aims to project a new image of Sendero. The kidnapping of the Techint workers was proof of this, as well as an action of 'armed propaganda' intended to reawaken public awareness of Sendero. With this operation, as in current advertising campaigns, the aim is to replace the image Peruvians have of SL as ruthless killers with one of defenders of the needy who are only violent towards the military and police.
The main conclusion drawn by Proseguir's leadership is that the 'historical' SL lost the war because the degree of violence they used precluded the population seeing them as their defenders, and for that reason when the army arrived at the Ene, they were able to recruit the farmers into creating the rondas to fight SL. To reassure the population of their peaceful intent, they are putting greater emphasis on politics than on violence - while the government seems to be going in the opposite direction.
End of preview - This article contains approximately 1702 words.
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